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CRIMINOLOGY
THE RELEVANCE OF "MATCHING" DNA:
IS THE WINDOW HALF OPEN OR HALF
SHUT?
D.H. KAYE*
The basic concepts are always the hardest. This is particularly
true in the study of evidence. Relevant evidence is evidence that alters
the probability of a fact that matters, and relevant evidence generally
is admissible unless it is too prejudicial.1 Despite this seemingly sim-
ple formulation, questions of relevance relating to DNA evidence-
even to the most elementary concept of a "match" between two DNA
samples- can be confusing.
Well established methods of molecular biology permit laborato-
ries to compare DNA from a crime scene to DNA from a defendant.2
If the DNA in these samples is similar, the match usually is powerful
evidence that the incriminating DNA came from the defendant. To
describe the incriminating effect of the resemblance, scientists may
use numbers. The numbers seen most frequently in criminal cases are
* Regents' Professor, Arizona State University, College of Law, Box 877906, Tempe AZ
85287-7906 (602 965-2922; k@asu.edu). I am grateful to Bruce Budowle, Jay Koehler, Wil-
liam Thompson, Bruce Weir, and especially David Balding for comments on a draft of this
paper.
1 See FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); FED. R. EVID. 402
("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided.. . ."); FED. R. EVID. 403
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.").
2 The DNA at the crime scene may come from the defendant's blood, semen, or saliva.
In other cases, the victim's DNA may be found on the defendant's property. See, e.g., State
v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
Although the discussion here explicitly refers to only the former situation, the analysis
applies to both methods of linking a defendant to a crime.
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numbers referred to as the match frequency. These are estimates of
the relative frequency of other people whose DNA also would match
the crime scene DNA according to the criteria the laboratory uses for
declaring a match.3
In court, the most successful objection to these numbers has been
that the standard computational method does not account adequately
for "population structure."4 Arguments targeting the criteria for de-
claring a match have not fared as well.5 In a recent article on the
"DNA War," Professor William C. Thompson sought to correct this
situation.6 Already a veteran of a few skirmishes in the war,7 Professor
Thompson believes that when a defendant argues that "the match cri-
teria should have been drawn in a narrower manner that excludes
him," the finding of a match "could properly be excluded under Fed-
eral Rule 403."8 At the very least, he believes that the court should
3 Some courts seem to require such testimony. E.g., Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 76
(Del. 1993) (finding trial court's exclusion of match frequency "inherently inconsistent"
with its admission of testimony of a match, because "without the necessary statistical calcu-
lations, the evidence of the match was 'meaningless' to the jury."); State v. Brown, 470
N.W.2d 30, 31-33 (Iowa 1991) (ruling expert testimony that "the likelihood of a person
matching in all four fragments ...would be one in several billion" admissible, since
"[w]ithout statistical evidence, the ultimate results of DNA testing would become a matter
of speculation."); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992) ("A match is virtu-
ally meaningless without a statistical probability expressing the frequency with which a
match could occur."). It would not, however, be "meaningless" to inform thejury that two
samples match and that this match makes it more probable, in an amount that is not
precisely known, that the DNA in the samples comes from the same person. Also, when all
estimates of the frequency are in the millionths or billionths, it would not be meaningless
to inform the jury that there is a match that is known to be extremely rare in the general
population. D.H. Kaye, The Forensic Debut of the National Research Council's DNA Report: Popu-
lation Structure, Ceiling Frequencies, and the Need for Numbers, 34 JuxuMEmcs J. 369, 380-82
(1994).
4 United States v.Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 263 (D. Vt. 1990) ("substructure is argua-
bly the weakest link of the DNA profiling chain"), affd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
113 U.S. 104 (1992). See aso CoMMrrrEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 79 (1992) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT] ("whether actual populations have significant substructure for the loci used" is
"the key question"). "Substructure" refers to the presence of subgroups that have distinc-
tive DNA patterns and that tend to mate among themselves. For the view that courts some-
times have erred in excluding the estimates on this ground, see D.H. Kaye, DNA Evidence:
Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 101 (1993).
5 See Kaye, supra note 4; William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic
Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War," 84J. CRIM. L. & CRiMINOLOGY 22, 50-51
(1993) ("Only one court has held that the dispute over the FBI's matching procedure
precludes the admissibility of the test under Frye.").
6 Thompson, supra note 5.
7 See, e.g., People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Los Angeles County Superior Court, Mo-
tion to Exclude DNA Evidence, Oct. 4, 1994); State v. Anderson, No. CR 46255 (Dist. Ct.,
Bernalillo County, Memorandum in Opposition to the Introduction of the FBI's DNA Evi-
dence, Apr. 3, 1990).
8 Thompson, supra note 5, at 60. Professor Thompson recommends exclusion only
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allow expert testimony to the jury that the match criteria are too inclu-
sive.9 In contrast, I have argued that:
Disputes over the strictness of particular windows or the optimal match
window-when there is no such thing-may confuse and perplex the
jury when it considers the probative value of a match. As a result, a court
has discretion to exclude this testimony.' 0
This Article shows that Professor Thompson's call for exclusion
of DNA evidence or for expert testimony on the definition of a match
is not responsive to the concern that animates and underlies his pro-
posal. If anything, a more radical response-rejecting the very notion
of a simple "match"-may be in order. To reach these conclusions,
Parts I and II describe the basic ideas of "matching" and "binning"
that are central to the usual analysis of DNA evidence. Part III out-
lines a theory of probative value that illuminates the limitations of
match-binning. With these fundamentals in place, Parts IV and V ad-
dress Professor Thompson's concern and demonstrate that, depend-
ing on circumstances yet to be established, it could warrant a
modification in the way that DNA evidence is presented, though not
necessarily the one that Professor Thompson endorses.
The analysis demands a careful definition of probative value and
a clear understanding of the matching process and its statistical
properties. These can be obtained only in the currency of some math-
ematical notation and concepts. This price, however, is well worth
paying. At the most practical level, the exercise promises to improve
the presentation of DNA evidence. In addition, it illuminates the
workings of a theory of probative value and inductive proof that evi-
dence scholars have been propounding for some time."
when "the defendant makes a strong showing prior to trial that the observed discrepancies
are unlikely to have arisen if the 'matching' prints have a common source." I.
9 Id. at 60 n.171.
10 Kaye, supra note 4, at 114-15 (footnotes omitted).
11 Although this theory has deep roots in the works of logicians, philosophers, psychol-
ogists, and statisticians, much of the exposition and development in the legal literature has
come from the University of Michigan Law School. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The New
Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof 66 B.U. L. REv. 439 (1986), reprinted in
PROBABILrrY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYEsIANIsM
61 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988) [hereinafter Tillis & Green]; Richard Fried-
man, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhau 38
UCLA L. REv. 637 (1991); Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U. L.
REv. 733 (1986). The "Michigan School," however, emphasizes Bayes' rule for combining
new information with prior probabilities of hypotheses. The approach used in this Article
focuses on the concept of relative likelihood which can be embraced without a commit-
ment to Bayesian reasoning in general. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, Introduction: What is Bayesian-
ism?, in Tillers & Green, supra, at 1. There are critics of the Michigan School, but they do
not always offer clear alternatives. See, e.g., RonaldJ. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of
Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 604, 627-28 (1994) (sketching a "theory ofjuridical evidence"
that "reduces to the proposition that a disinterested fact finder reconstructs the past based
678 [Vol. 85
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I. MATCHING
The most common form of DNA analysis in criminal cases utilizes
four or five "single locus VNTR probes" to produce a "multilocus gen-
otype," or, more simply, a "DNA profile." Technicians use techniques
of molecular biology to excise fragments of chromosomes 12 that begin
and end with certain sequences of DNA base pairs from samples
found in blood, semen, or other material containing sufficient DNA.' 3
The beginning and ending sequences are chosen so that the material
they bracket tends to vary in size from person to person.
The lengths of the DNA fragments are measured by seeing how
far they move, relative to DNA fragments of known lengths, through a
slab of gelatinous material, under the pull of an electric charge. The
procedure is known as electrophoresis. In a given time, shorter frag-
ments (with low molecular weight) migrate farther down the electro-
phoretic gel than longer fragments (with high molecular weight).14
Fragments of approximately the same size will stop at more or less the
same point, coalescing to form a spot or band. By measuring the loca-
tions of the bands it is possible to determine the approximate lengths of
the fragments. 15 The prevailing method of agarose gel electrophore-
sis of VNTR fragments is not sensitive' enough to distinguish between
on all the observational inputs available at the moment ofjudging").
12 A chromosome is a tightly coiled molecule of DNA packed in protein. Each parent
supplies one of 23 different chromosomes, so the human genome consists of 46 chromo-
somes arranged into 23 pairs.
13 For present purposes, DNA may be thought of as a book whose letters are "base
pairs." Bacterial enzymes are used to cut the DNA "text" into fragments. A given "restric-
tion enzyme" binds to DNA when it encounters a certain short sequence of DNA base pairs
and cleaves the DNA at a specific site. For example, the Hae III enzyme acts like a scissors
cutting the text.. .GGCC ... GGCC.. . to yield the fragment CC.. .GG. "Digesting" DNA
with such an enzyme usually produces fragments ranging from several hundred to several
thousand base pairs in length.
14 The molecular weight of a compound is equal to the total mass of its constituent
atoms. Since DNA fragments all have pretty much the same mix of atoms, a fragment that
has twice the length of another also has about twice the molecular weight.
15 In many instances, the bands are sharp and clear, sometimes, they are fuzzy. Indeed,
in some cases there are disputes over the presence or absence of bands, since laboratory
artifacts sometimes produce missing bands or spurious bands. See DavidJ. Balding & Peter
Donnelly, How Convincing is DNA Evidence?, 368 NATREa 285, 286 (1994); William C.
Thompson & Simon Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation of
DNA Prints, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 93, 138 (M-A. Farley & J.J. Harrington eds.,
1991).
This Article limits itself to the problem of determining the size of the match window.
To keep the focus sharply on this issue, it considers only cases in which there is no doubt as
to the existence and measurements of the bands on the autoradiogram. When they are
present, uncertainties created by missing or extra bands and deviations from objective pro-
cedures for ascertaining the positions of bands can degrade the probative value of a de-
clared match. Cf. D.H. Kaye, Comment: Uncertainty in DNA Profile Eviden 6 STAT. ScI. 196,
196-97 (1991) (noting the potential importance of these factors).
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fragments that are extremely close in size. Measurement error creeps
in.
The likely extent of this measurement error is found through re-
producibility studies. For example, a laboratory may compare the
fragment lengths in DNA obtained from vaginal swabs with that of
DNA in blood taken from the same woman. 16 Such studies enable the
laboratory to choose a "window" wide enough to be likely to result in a
match when two samples come from the same source. For instance,
studies conducted by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
DNA laboratory found that corresponding bands never differed by
more than ±2.8% of their average length.' 7 The FBI reports that the
biggest difference observed in its laboratory is less than ±2.5%.18
Once a laboratory establishes a numerical matching rule, techni-
cians can compare the crime scene fragment lengths to fragment
lengths from a suspect. Suppose that a window of width ±2.5% is cho-
sen. 19 If a visual match is declared, and if all pairs of corresponding
bands in the two profiles differ by no more than ±2.5%, then the two
profiles are said to match.
The match window does not have to be any particular size. Big
windows are likely to result in the declaration of a match when the
DNA samples come from the same person. In this case, the procedure
is highly sensitive-it has a large probability of declaring a match
when the samples have a common source. Along with a high sensitiv-
ity, a suitable window should yield a high specificity. Specificity refers
to the probability that the procedure will not declare a match when
the samples do not come from the same person. A wide window en-
hances sensitivity; a narrow window favors specificity. When the sensi-
tivity is high, DNA from the same sources almost always match and
there are relatively few false negatives.20 When the specificity is high,
16 Bruce Budowle et al., Fixed-Bin Analysis for Statistical Evaluation of Continuous Distribu-
tions of Allelic Data ftom VNTR Loci, for Use in Forensic Comparisons, 48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
841 (1991). Since epithelial cells from the swabs and blood cells from the same person
contain identical DNA, the measurements would be the same in the absence of measure-
ment error. An alternative corresponding to rape cases would be to compare semen and
blood samples from the same man.
17 B.S. Weir & B.S. Gaut, Matching and Binning DNA Fragments in Forensic Science, 34
JuRiMETRacSJ. 9 (1993).
18 Budowle et al., supra note 16, at 844.
19 Because the speed at which fragments move through the gel varies over different
regions of the gel, the absolute size of the experimental error tends to be larger for larger
bands. Hence, the window is a percentage of the molecular weight or size of a fragment.
In light of the studies cited above, the FBI uses a window of ±2.5%; the South Carolina
laboratory uses ±2.8%.
20 For the purposes of this Article, a false negative is a failure to declare a match be-
tween two samples of DNA from the same person. One group of researchers found that a
match window of ±1.2% with three probes produced false negatives nearly 20% of the
680 [Vol. 85
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DNA from different people almost always fail to match and there are
few false positives.2' Thus, statistical reasoning gives the operating
characteristics of the matching procedure,22 but scientific values do
not dictate the choice of a unique match window.
23
Once a reproducibility study shows that a window has reasonable
specificity, the evidentiary analysis should focus on ensuring that the
testimony about the match fairly describes the probative value of the
laboratory results. Will testimony about the properties of different
windows aid in this task? Are there situations where the difficulty of
expressing the probative value makes it better to exclude the evidence
of a match? To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyze plau-
sible ways to express the probative value of the "match." At least three
possibilities exist: proportions, similarity likelihood ratios, and match-
binning likelihood ratios. Parts II and III describe these measures.
Part IV applies -them to expose the flaws in Professor Thompson's ar-
gument for admitting testimony about the desirability of smaller
time. The rates would be larger for four or five probes, since each probe creates more
opportunities for a false negative to occur. I.W. Evett et al., An Illustration of the Advantages
of Efficient Statistical Methods for RFLP Analysis in Forensic Scienc 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETIcs
498, 502 (1993).
21 For present purposes, a false positive is a declaration of a match between DNA from
different people.
22 It is possible to argue that some minimum values of the sensitivity and specificity of
the test are needed to establish scientific validity. The need for scientific validity (under
the rubric of "evidentiary reliability") is emphasized in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The first two federal appellate cases apply-
ing the Daubert standard of "good [scientific] grounds" to DNA evidence are United States
v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming the admission of a match on the record
developed in the extensive pre-trial hearing in United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D.
Ohio 1991)), and United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the
admission of a match and a "conservative" estimate of the genotype frequency among
Navajos).
The need to demonstrate scientific validity under Daubert may require reproducibility
studies to establish that a laboratory is capable of declaring a match for DNA samples from
the same person. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 56-57. But the minimum error rates that
make a clinical test acceptable to scientists (or to anyone else) depend on the costs of false
positives and false negatives in light of the uses to which the test is put. Low specificity, for
example, may be acceptable in a test, like a pap smear, that is used to screen for certain
conditions whose presence can be confirmed by more definitive (and more expensive)
tests. Rather than ask the abstract and unanswerable question of what values of sensitivity
and specificity science demands, it seems more profitable for courts to inquire directly into
the helpfulness of the test to thejury. In other words, the "science" requirement of Daubert
should apply to the determination of whether the analytic procedure is capable of per-
forming as warranted by scientists and technicians-whether it is indeed scientific-but
not to whether the advertised or known level of performance is satisfactory for legal
purposes.
23 See Kaye, supra note 4, at 114-15 n.67; Kathryn Roeder, Roinder, 9 STAT. ScI. 267, 275
(1994) ("the 'objective' match criterion ... is, in fact, simply an arbitrary rule."); see also
infra note 43.
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match windows. Part V describes an alternative approach that may be
better tailored to the possible problem.
II. BINNING
The conventional procedure for presenting incriminating DNA
evidence in this country entails not just the declaration of a match,
but also an estimate of the relative frequency with which other people
in some population would match the crime scene DNA. This match-
ing proportion of the population, designated as some number P,
plainly has some connection to the probative value of the match.24 If
P approaches 1, then so many innocent people would match that the
match proves little; if P approaches zero, then it may prove a great
deal.25
It is possible to estimate P from a random sample of people from
a suitable reference population. For example, consider a case in
which a woman is kidnapped, assaulted, and robbed at a rest stop on
an interstate highway by a truck driver who is white,26 and in which
the DNA comparison is limited to a single band.2 7 With DNA from a
suitable random sample of Caucasians, P could be estimated on the
basis of the proportions of bands that fall into predefined intervals of
molecular weights. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical distribution of band
weights over ten intervals, or fixed "bins,"28 numbered zero through
24 See supra note 4.
25 Often, P is interpreted as the probability that a randomly selected, or innocent per-
son will have DNA that matches the crime scene sample. If so, it is akin to what statisticians
usually call a "p-value" or "significance probability"-the probability under the "null hy-
pothesis" of observing data within a region (the match window) that (when small enough)
prompts rejection of the "null hypothesis." Under the null hypothesis that someone other
than the defendant is the source of the crime scene DNA (and assuming that suspects are
not selected because of factors related to their DNA profiles and that no laboratory errors
occur), the probability of declaring a match is just the proportion of people in the popula-
tion who have profiles that satisfy the match criteria.
26 See United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 104 (1992).
27 Computing Pwhen more than one band is compared in the two samples has proved
intensely controversial. For reviews, see, for example, Kaye, supra note 4; Kathryn Roeder,
DNA Fingerinting: A Review of the Controversy, 9 STAT. Sci. 222 (1994); Thompson, supra
note 5. The issue here, however, is not the details of combining the information from the
analyses at each band, but what use to make of even undeniably accurate estimates of P,
either for a single band or for many bands. For convenience, the text only considers the
simplified, one-band comparison.
28 A variation uses "floating" bins. See, e.g., Keith L. Monson & Bruce Budowle, A Com-
parison of the Fixed Bin Method with the Floating Bin and Direct Count Methods: Effect of VNTR
Profile Frequency Estimation and Reference Population, 38 J. FoaNnsic Scx. 1037 (1993); B.S.
Weir, Independence of VNTR Alleles Defined as Floating Bins, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 992
(1992). Because the differences do not affect the results of the analysis here, the discus-
sion is limited to fixed bins.
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bin number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 increasing
weight
FIGURE 1
HIsToGRAM OF BAND WEIGHTS.
The height of each column is proportional to the fraction of bands that
lie within each "bin," which are 12%, 8%, 16%, 8%, 4%, 8%, 20%, 8%,
12%, and 4%, respectively. No bands lie outside the numbered
intervals.
Suppose that the crime scene DNA band is in the center of bin 0 and
that the bins are much wider than the match window. 0 Then an esti-
mated twelve percent of the bands from the Caucasian population
would "match." Under'the simplified scenario of examining a ran-
domly chosen single band, P=.12. In this hypothetical case, the prose-
cution might offer testimony that the samples match and that such
matches would be seen in no more than twelve percent of the Cauca-
sian population.
III. PROBATIVE VALUE
The best developed and most plausible theory of probative value
29 The choice of ten bins is illustrative; in practice, more may be employed. See, e.g.,
John S. Waye & Ronald M. Fourney, Forensic DNA Typing of Highly Polymorphic VNTR Loc, in
3 FoRENsic ScIENcE HANDBOOK 358, 385 (Richard Saferstein ed., 1993). To avoid values of
P that underestimate the proportion of matches that would be obtained in the population,
the width of the bins must be such that no bin is smaller than the match window. In
practice, considerably larger bins often are used, arguably leading to values of P that are
too large and thus understate the rarity of a match. But see Thompson, supra note 5, at 67
(reporting that only Cellmark Diagnostics uses bins larger than its "match standards").
so If the crime sample band were close to the boundary of two bins, then it ordinarily
would be safe to use the larger of the two bin heights-12% in this example. An extremely
cautious approach would be to use the sum of the heights-12 + 8 = 20%. See NRC RE-
PORT, supra note 4.
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articulated by legal scholars builds on a statistical concept known as
the likelihood ratio, or, more generally, the likelihood function.3 1
The idea is elegantly simple and exceedingly powerful. Evidence has
probative value with respect to competing hypotheses about the pro-
cess that generated the evidence. With DNA measurements there are
only two hypotheses: S, that the data arose from a common source of
DNA, and -S, that they did not 3 2 To the extent that the data are more
probable under S than -S, they support S over -S. To measure this
degree of support, the "likelihood" of S is defined as being propor-
tional to the conditional probability of the data given that S is true.
33
A convenient measure of probative value is the ratio of the likelihoods
for the two hypotheses:
34
Likelihood (S) Pr(dataS)
Likelihood (-S) Pr (data/-S)
As long as L is greater than 1, the DNA data support the hypothesis S.
When L is less than 1, they support -S. When L equals 1, they are
expected to arise as frequently when one hypothesis is true as when
the other is true. Hence, they provide no reason to favor one hypoth-
esis over the other and are irrelevant to choosing between them.
Thus, the more the value of L departs from unity, the greater the pro-
bative value of the data.
Despite its mathematical form, equation (1) is ambiguous: How
should the "data" be represented? At the most detailed level, DNA
data consist of two sets of numbers denoting the approximate molecu-
lar weights of the fragments from the two samples. The useful infor-
mation in these two profiles involves both the observed weights of
each pair of corresponding fragments and the similarity in each pair
of measurements. For instance, suppose that a single-locus probe pro-
duces a band that seems to be 2328 base pairs long for the crime
scene sample and a corresponding band 2352 base pairs long for the
defendant's DNA,35 and that this is the only band to consider. The
31 See supra note 11.
32 The hypothesis -S can be thought of as the disjunction of hypotheses about everyone
else in the relevant population. If all the people who might be the source of the crime
scene DNA are labelled 1 through n (with the defendant being designated as person 1),
and if the defendant, who is the source of the DNA being compared to the crime scene
DNA, is not the source of the latter sample, then either person 2 is the source, person 3 is,
and so on, through person n.
33 See A.W.F. EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD: AN AccouNT OF THE STATISTICAL CONCEPT OF LIKE-
LIHOOD AND ITS APPLICATION TO SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE (1972).
34 See, e.g., Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977). For
other possible expressions of probative value, see Friedman, supra note 11; D.H. Kaye,
Comment: Quantifying Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REv. 761 (1986).
35 See Thompson, supra note 5, at 58 (figure 3).
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measurements are each 12 base pairs away from their mean of 2340
base pairs. The probative value of this pair of measurements depends
on how rare bands in this region are, as well as the measured differ-
ence of 24 base pairs (1.03%). This difference, (d), together with the
mean weight x, may be substituted for the expression "data" in (1) to
yield the "similarity likelihood ratio":
Pr(x,aS)
Pr(x,d1S)
For a particular mean fragment weight x, the closer d is to 0, the bet-
ter the corresponding bands match, and the greater the value of L.
For a given separation d, the rarer the measurement weights are in the
population, the greater the value of L.
3 6
The match-binning approach does not make full use of d and x.
"Pure" match-binning merely asks whether d is inside or outside the
predefined match window.3 7 This offers a simpler, but cruder repre-
36 On computing L, see David Jajoura et al., Likelihood Ratios for Deoxyribonud& Acid
(DNA) Typing in Criminal Cases, 39 J. FoaRNsic Sci. 64 (1994); Kaye, supra note 4, at 162
n.254; Roeder, supra note 27. While grossly oversimplified, this exposition is intended to
capture the features of L that are important to the analysis of a claim that a match window
is too broad.
37 In more technical jargon, instead of treating d as the continuous variable that it is,
match-binning converts d into a binary variable, throwing away information. In practice,
however, the declaration of a match is not so black-and-white. For one thing, human judg-
ment may enter into the determination of whether a faint band actually is present or
whether seemingly extra bands are laboratory artifacts. See supra note 15. Furthermore,
even if the full set of bands to consider is clear, and even if they meet the statistical criteria
for a match, subjective judgment may be involved in deciding whether these bands "really"
match. Realizing that an electrophoretic artifact known as band-shifting sometimes results
in all the bands being shifted in more or less the same proportion from their true values,
an examiner may decide that two profiles match when all the differences between the
samples are in the same direction and close to the edge of the match window, but not
when the differences go in both directions. The former situation is consistent with a very
close match distorted by band-shifting; the latter is not. To the extent that examiners rely
on the actual size of the differences and not just the fact that the differences fall within the
preset window in declaring matches, the match-binning procedure does use some of the
information about the degree of matching.
It is difficult to model the effect of these subjective aspects on probative value. For the
purpose of analyzing the relevance of testimony about match windows, this Article assumes
that there are no ambiguities in the existence of bands. As for the second, subjective phase
of matching, since examiners presumably screen out the cases in which matches are weak
more often than they discard excellent matches, one might argue that their review can
only enhance the probative value of a purely statistical match. Even if the subjective judg-
ments were entirely arbitrary-made, for example, by flipping a coin to decide whether a
statistically tolerable match will be deemed a match-the subjective component still could
not lower the probative value. Consequently, the type of match-binning described and
analyzed in this Article-involving purely statistical matching-may understate the proba-
tive value of those matches that arise in practice. But see infra note 46. On the other hand,
if Professor Thompson is correct in his claims that examiners frequently declare matches
that do not satisfy statistical criteria, then the analysis applicable to purely statistical match-
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sentation of the "data" in (1). The fragments either match (r=l) or
they do not (m=)-there are no shades of gray-
'r(mIS)L = l WS (3)
Pr(I-S)
This likelihood ratio is relatively easy to compute. Suppose, as in the
example of Part II, that there is a match with a bin frequency of P=-.12.
The denominator is the probability of declaring a match when -S is
true.38 When the suspect and the source of the crime scene DNA are
unrelated, this probability cannot exceed a generous estimate 9 of the
proportion of the Caucasian population with a matching band:40
Pr(nWS)L = P (4)
The numerator is the probability of a match given S. It depends on
the size of the match window. It approaches one (1) as the match
ing could overstate the probative value of the matches that arise in practice.
38 But cf. David J. Balding et al., Comment: Some Causes for Concern about DNA Profiles, 9
STAT. Sci. 248, 249 (1994) ("[O]ne needs to consider each possible culprit and to assess
the probability that they would match the crime profile, given that the defendant does.");
B.S. Weir, Conditional Genotypic Frequencies in Forensic Analysis (Oct. 19, 1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript focusing on "It]he conditional probability that the accused suspect has
the matching profile, given that the perpetrator of the crime has the profile and that these
people are not the same").
39 See supra note 29.
40 Balding et al., supra note 38, at 249, contend that one must consider the likelihoods
of each alternative hypothesis in note 32 supra, and that "[s]tatistical analyses of forensic
databases are not directly relevant to an assessment of the conditional probabilities" that
determine these likelihoods. They argue that the very fact that the defendant matches
makes it more probable that relatives of the defendant and others in the same ethnic
subpopulation also would match. Because of these "positive correlations," they conclude
that using the population proportion is "both false and detrimental to the defence." Id
So too, Balding and Nichols maintain that the conditional probability differs from the
estimated population proportion because "[i]f the suspect is innocent then we have ob-
served two copies of a profile which is believed to be extremely rare in the database popula-
tion," and "this observation makes more likely the possibility that the profile is more
common in the suspect population than in the database population." DavidJ. Balding &
Richard A. Nichols, DNA Profile Match Probability Calculation, 64 FoRE'sic Sci. Iur'L 125, 128
(1994). Thus, these researchers propose using the proportions for the defendant's ethnic
subpopulation rather than the broad racial population in estimating the likelihoods. Bald-
ing et al., supranote 38, at 249. This Article does not pursue these ideas-not because they
are unimportant, but because the topic is the objection that the match window is too wide
rather than the choice of the reference population or subpopulation.
Second, the use of the proportion in the database for the denominator of the likeli-
hood ratio ignores the possibility of laboratory error. This possibility is important, but it is
another distinct problem. The complaint that P is misleading in a way that justifies testi-
mony about the size of match windows does not turn on the risk of such error. For a
review of possible ways to ensure that jurors do not ignore this consideration, see Kaye,
supra note 4, at 156-58. The issue also is addressed by several commentators in Roeder,
supra note 27.
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window grows very large. The FBI, for example, uses a match window
that is slightly larger than the biggest difference observed in its
laboratory for the same sample measured twice.41 Some critics have
complained that this window amounts to plus-or-minus four standard
errors of measurement. 42 This, they say, is too large.43 Although the
figure of four standard errors may be misleading,44 there are
indications that the errors follow the ubiquitous normal curve.45
Since 99.994% of the area under a normal curve lies within four
standard errors to either side of its center, an examiner who always
declares a match for a band when the band from the crime sample
and the corresponding band from the defendant's sample are within
41 Budowle, supranote 16, at 844. Specifically, the FBI requires that bands be separated
by no more than ±2.5% of their mean molecular weight to declare a match. See supra note
19. It also requires the examiner to say that profiles that meet this criteria look like
matches.
42 E.g., Seymour Geisser, Some Statistical Issues in Medicine and Forensics, 87 J. AM. STAT.
Ass'N 607, 609 (1992). The standard error is the standard deviation of the difference
between two measurements; it indicates the variability of the differences. For a sample
batch of differences, it is computed by subtracting each difference from the mean
difference, squaring this deviation from the mean, adding up all the squares, dividing by
the size of the sample, and extracting the square root. In other words, it is the root mean
square deviation. If all the differences are identical, the deviations from the mean are all
zero, and the standard error will be zero. If all lie at two polar extremes, all the deviations
are large, and the standard error will be large.
The standard error of DNA molecular weight measurements is not really a constant
percentage of the true weight. See I.W. Evett et al., An Efficient Statistical Procedure for
Interpreting DNA Single-Locus Profiling Data in Crime Cases, 32J. FoRENsic Sci. Soc'y 307, 316
(1992) (table 2). In the interest of brevity, this Article ignores this complication.
43 Geisser, supra note 42 ("an extraordinarily wide net"). Some experts in United States
v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), affid sub norm., United States v. Bond, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993), claimed that the FBI's window is too wide because "the level of risk for
false positives (matches)" exceeds that which is "generally accepted as reliable in the
research and clinical communities for similar applications of this technology." Thompson,
supra note 5, at 48-49 nn.122-23 (quoting Report of Professor Peter D'Eustachio, An
Evaluation of the FBI's Environmental Insult Validation Study and the FBs Quantitative Matching
Criteria, at 16, in Yee; 129 F.R.D. 629). Since these communities have no similar
applications of the technology, however, this version of the criticism seems odd. Unlike a
diagnostician or (perhaps) a research scientist, the forensic expert need not and should
not choose between two hypotheses. Rather, the forensic expert faces the unique
challenge of presenting the scientific evidence bearing on the hypotheses so that the jury
will appreciate its actual probative value. See Kaye, supra note 4.
44 The ±4 figure pertains to the standard error derived from K12 cell line (control
DNA) measurements. These involve fresh DNA that produces less variable measurements
than forensic samples, reducing this size of the standard error, and making it appear that a
given difference represents a larger number of standard errors. Thus, Eric S. Lander,
Invited Editorial" Research on DNA Typing Catching Up with Courtroom Application, 48 AM. J.
HuM. GENmTIcs 819,7820 (1991), reports that the Bureau's laboratory has a standard error
of about 1.5% of the molecular weight of their mean. If so, the ±2.5% match window
corresponds to only ±1.7 standard errors.
45 Donald A. Berry et al., Statistical Inference in Crime Investigations Using Deoxyribonucleic
Acid Profiling, 41 APPUED STAT. 499 (1992).
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the ±2.5% window will be correct in 99.994% of the cases when S is
true:4 Pr(m=l IS) = .99994. More generally, if A(w) stands for the
area within a match window that extends a distance ±w about the
center of the normal error curve for duplicate measurements, the
match-binning likelihood ratio becomes:
L = A(w)/P. (5)
Two salient points emerge. First, there is some tension between
the similarity likelihood ratio (2) and the match-binning ratio (5).
The former attends to the precise degree of matching; the latter
pretends that all "matches" are equally revealing. In a case in which
the value obtained from (2) is much less than that obtained with (3),
the match-binning likelihood ratio can give an inflated impression of
probative value.
47
Second, even within the confines of (5), P is incomplete because
it relates solely to the denominator of L. Ajuror who implicitly thinks
in terms of likelihood ratios, and who is not apprised of A(w), might
treat A(w) as if its value were 1, and weigh the evidence as if its
probative value were given by the following "P only" likelihood ratio:
L = 1/P. (6)
Comparing (5) and (6), if A(w) were dramatically less than 1,48 then
presenting only the value of P could lead a jury to give the fact of a
match more weight than it deserves. If this is the argument for ex-
cluding match-binning evidence, however, it has little force. As Part
IV explains, the match windows are wide enough to ensure that
matches are probative.
46 This applies to a single band. For most people, eight or more bands are compared.
According to Bonferroni's inequality, the probability of at least one mismatch in eight
comparisons is, at most, 8 x .00006 = .00048. Therefore, the probability of eight matches
cannot be any less than 1 - .00048 = .99952. Examiners who rely on their impressions of
band-shifting to exclude some statistical matches, see supra note 37, may lower the
probability of declaring a match when the DNA samples originate from the same
individual.
47 The results of matching with a subjective element could have a likelihood ratio closer
to that given by (2). See supra note 37.
48 If A(w) were less than P, then the likelihood ratio (5) would indicate that the evi-
dence does not support the hypothesis of a common source. Cf Thompson, supra note 5,
at 57. To some extent, this reinforces the conclusion of Part I. Unless the laboratory can
demonstrate that it can reliably declare matches for DNA from the same source, the evi-
dence should be inadmissible. However, in terms of logical relevance as opposed to the
more demanding Daubert standard, what counts is not whether the chance of declaring a
match when S holds close to 1, but whether it is substantially larger than the chance under
-S. If the DNA bands are extremely rare, then the latter quantity can be quite small, so that
even modestly reliable DNA tests may produce highly probative matches.
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IV. THOMPSON'S ARGUMENT
Professor Thompson agrees that in many cases the demand for
narrower windows would not assist the jury. His argument for admit-
ting testimony about the width of the match window is terse. He cau-
tiously suggests that it "might well be appropriate" to exclude
testimony of a match "if the defendant makes a strong showing prior
to trial that the observed discrepancies are unlikely to have arisen if
the 'matching' prints have a common source."49 This showing, he
thinks, would support a defense argument that "the match criteria
should have been drawn in a narrower manner."50 Noting the inabil-
ity of "lawyers and jurors to deal with complex scientific and statistical
arguments,"51 Thompson concludes that Rule 403 "could properly"
justify exclusion of the evidence. 52 But if testimony as to a match is to
be admitted, he insists that reasonable people could not differ on the
relevance of testimony favoring a smaller window that would not pro-
duce a match.5
3
His argument, however, is not conclusive. In more detail, the ar-
gument splits into two branches, as follows:
I When the numerator of the appropriate likelihood ratio is
substantially less than 1, P is a misleading measure of the
probative value of a match.
Ha Expert testimony that a smaller window would exclude the
defendant might prevent the jury from being misled by the
discrepancy between 1/P and the more appropriate likelihood
ratio.
Ma Therefore, courts should allow expert testimony that a smaller
match window would exclude 'the defendant.
IRb Alternatively, explaining to a jury that the numerator of the
appropriate likelihood ratio is substantially less than 1 would
be too hard or ineffective.
IlIb Therefore, courts should exclude evidence of the match and
of the match frequency P.
This formulation discloses an ambiguity. Which likelihood ra-
tio-(2) or (5) -must be substantially less than 1? If (I) refers to (5),
then for the hypothetical case outlined in Part II, the likelihood ratio
is L = .99994/.12 = 8.327. Ajuror who implicitly uses the oversimpli-
fied "P only" ratio (6) would think that L = 1/.12 = 8.333-hardly a
mistake that cries out for redress. This is because the condition in (I)
that might produce a misleading picture is not satisfied-the numera-
49 Thompson, supra note 5, at 60.
50 Id.
51 I& at 60 n.171. See also id. at n.170.
52 I& at 60 & n.171.
53 I& at 60 n.171.
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tor is not substantially less than 1. Instead, it is all but identical to 1.
Suppose, however, that the condition in (I) were fulfilled-that a
laboratory used a window amounting to ±1 standard errors instead of
±4. Then the numerator A(w) becomes .6827, a value that is substan-
tially less than 1. It follows that L = .6827/.12 = 5.689 instead of the "P
only" value of 8.333.54 In this event, the argument still fails, because
(Ila) is false. Expert testimony that a smaller window would exculpate
the defendant would not prevent the jury from being misled. The
expert concerned with the match-binning likelihood ratio would have
to testify that the laboratory should use a larger window-exactly the
opposite of the testimony that has been heard to date.55
So if the focus is on match-binning proportions, the argument
founders at the outset. If Professor Thompson was writing about the
match-binning likelihood ratio, he would be correct in identifying
Pr(mIS) as a possible source of cognitive error. Instead of justifying
smaller match windows that would exonerate the defendant, however,
a small Pr(mIS) would motivate larger windows that would continue to
inculpate the defendant.
Thus, Thompson must not be concerned with the match-binning
likelihood ratio. Instead, his argument may be that when the numera-
tor Pr(x, dlS) of the similarity likelihood ratio (2) is "quite small,"56 Pis
misleading and either justifies testimony that the match window is too
large or warrants exclusion of the match altogether.
But even under this interpretation, what is in question is the full
likelihood ratio, not just its numerator, and the event of an observed
distance d between two bands is mathematically very different from
the existence or non-existence of a match. Whereas the numerator of
the match-binning likelihood ratio may be calculated as an area A(w)
under a part of a normal curve, the numerator of the similarity likeli-
54 This assumes that the number of bins remains unchanged. With a smaller match
window, more bins with smaller bin widths would be appropriate. This change, however,
could only reduce P (since fewer bands would fall into most of the smaller bins). Reducing
P would raise both the correct value of the match-binning likelihood ratio, A(w)/P, and
the perceived value, 1/P. The illustrative numbers would change, but the general picture
would not.
55 See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), a ld sub nom., United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); supra text accompanying note 42.
56 Thompson writes: "In formal terms, the defendant should make a showing that p(D/
HI) is quite small." Thompson, supra note 5, at 60 n.168. The expression p(D/H1), in the
notation used here, would be Pr(AdS). The text of his article imposes the condition in (I)
that "the observed discrepancies are unlikely to have arisen if the 'matching' prints have a
common source." Id. at 60 (emphasis added). The "observed discrepancies" are abbrevi-
ated as d in equation (2) and D in Thompson's expression for the difference likelihood
ratio. Id. at 57 n.163. His definition of the likelihood ratio does not refer explicitly to the
location of the "matching" bands, presumably to make the expression easier to read.
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hood ratio is more like the area of a thin strip under the curve located
a distance d from the peak.57 Being a thin strip under a low-lying
curve rather than a broad region under the entire mnatch window ±w,
the numerator Pr(xaIS) always will be small.58 Likewise, the denomi-
nator in (2) is not the proportion P of match~es within a fixed, overly
broad window, as it was in (5). Now, the denominator is Pr(x,dI-S),
the probability (actually, the probability density) of seeing two bands
that represent the same DNA fragment separated by d and centered at
x, and it changes as x or d changes. Just as the numerator can be
much smaller than 1, this denominator can be much smaller than P.
P, after all, is the proportion of matches estimated with a bin that is
bigger than the match window, which, in turn, is bigger than the small
difference d. Pr(xdl-S) will involve but a small slice of this big bin.
Consequently, the "substantially less than 1" or "quite small" con-
dition of (I) is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the "P
only" likelihood ratio 1/P is too large. In principle at least, the nu-
merator can be much less than 1, but the probability of seeing the
same degree of matching with an innocent suspect also may be much
less than P. Therefore, a small numerator in (2) does not establish
that (2) is substantially less than (5). In short, it is not obvious that
Thompson's criterion accurately picks out those cases that could in-
volve the cognitive error at issue.59 Once again, the argument for ex-
57 This "thin strip" description is an approximation. Because d is a continuous variable,
(2) is the ratio of probability densities rather than probabilities, and the numerator is given
by the height of the normal curve at d rather than an area beneath the curve.
58 Even two bands that are very close will produce a small value of Pr(,dLS). For in-
stance, discrepancies ofjust about one standard error occur well under 1/3 of the time for
normally distributed errors. One third is the approximate probability of discrepancies of
one or more standard errors. The quantity in the similarity likelihood ratio (2) is not this
tail-end probability, but rather the probability density for exactly one standard error. See
supra note 57. This density might be given by the height of the normal curve at one stan-
dard error, which is 0.24. The height of the curve for two perfectly aligned bands-the
best result one could hope for when the samples are from the same source-is less than
0.40.
Of course, the normal curve is merely a model that fits the observed distribution of
errors in repeated measurements. A particular reproducibility study might show that more
than 40% of the replicates are perfectly aligned, or that fewer are perfectly aligned.
59 One study using one version of the difference likelihood ratio with data on three of
Lifecodes' probes reports that, on average, the combination of bands at each of the three
loci produce monotonically increasing ratios with decreasing values of d. The study finds
that at a separation of three standard errors, one probe gives an average likelihood ratio
below I (supportive of -S). At four standard errors, the average ratio for each probe is
much less than 1. Jarjoura et al., sup ra note 36, at 70 (table 1). The extent to which this
study indicates that focusing on the numerator of the difference likelihood ratio might
identify the troublesome cases is unclear. Being averages, these values do not pertain to all
cases. Moreover, they are averages for a ratio rather than just the numerator. If Professor
Thompson wished to test his criterion empirically, he could identify those cases in which
the difference likelihood ratio is substantially less than 1/P in a data set obtained by mea-
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pert testimony about the desirable size of match windows falters at the
first step.
V. REFORMULATING THE ARGUMENT AND SOLVING THE PROBLEM
When inspected, Professor Thompson's argument about match
windows is less than airtight. Nevertheless, the underlying concern
that Pis an imprecise proxy for probative value could be valid. Part III
explained that the match-binning likelihood ratio pretends that all
matches within an arbitrary window are equally revealing. Sometimes
the more precise similarity likelihood ratio (2) exceeds the match-bin-
ning ratios. Other times, the match-binning ratios exceed the similar-
ity likelihood ratio. If the disparity is serious, relying solely on P as a
measure of probative value could be misleading. But instead of identi-
fying these cases by looking solely to Pr(xaIS), as Thompson recom-
mends, it is better to look to suitable computations of the similarity
likelihood ratio. This captures the spirit of Thompson's analysis and
avoids the initial misstep.
If this reformulation is correct, the pivotal question becomes
what to do about the possible discrepancies between the best measure
of probative value (2) and the measure (6) that currently is put before
ajury. Clearly, the correct response is not testimony about the statisti-
cal properties or "scientific" acceptability of particular match windows.
The objection, at its root, is to the entire enterprise of binary
matching.60
The most radical reform would be a rule that barred prosecution
testimony about match-binning proportions, but admitted testimony
about likelihood ratios. While prosecutors have been advised to rely
on the similarity likelihood ratio instead of p,61 unless the match-bin-
suring many fragments twice and then see how well these discrepancies correspond to
"quite small" values for Pr(xdlS).
60 Of course, actual practice departs from the model of purely binary matching. See
supra note 37.
61 See, e.g., Donald A. Berry, DNA, Statistics, and the Simpson Case, CHANCE, Fall 1994, at 9,
10; Donald A. Berry, Inferences Using DNA Profiling in Forensic Identification and Paternity
Cases, 6 STAT. Sci. 175 (1991); J. Buckleton et al., A Continuous Model for Interpreting the
Positions of Bands in DNA Locus-Specific Work, 31 J. FoRENSIc SCI. Soc'y 353 (1991); Bernard
Devlin et al., Forensic Inference from DNA Fingerprints, 87 J. Am. STAT. ASS'N 337 (1992); Evett
et al., supra note 42. Evett favors characterizing the numerical value with descriptions like
"very strong evidence of identity." Id. Jarjoura et al., supra note 36, propose that the ex-
pert also provides the jury with the proportion of times that likelihood ratios as large or
larger than the one at bar have been obtained from different persons in large databases.
According to Evett et al., supra note 42, at 325 (Table 7), likelihood ratios exceeding 1000
almost always arise for repeated measurements of the same DNA and almost never occur in
comparing DNA from different people in a database. See also I.W. Evett, DNA Statistics:
Putting the Problems Into Perspective 33JuuMmTrucsJ. 139 (1992) (exhaustive pairing of 1500
Caucasians tested at three loci, generating over one million between-person comparisons
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ning ratios are typically far from the mark, compelling them to do so
may amount to overkill.62 The American criminal justice system gen-
erally relies on the parties to pick and choose from the available evi-
dence and to build the case that they think is best. When the value of
the match-binning ratio exceeds that of the similarity likelihood ratio,
but the prosecution prefers to rely on the simpler and perhaps more
easily comprehended approach, the defense can hardly object that
the prosecution has understated the strength of its own evidence.
In contrast, a court might permit the prosecution to introduce P,
and leave it to the defense to argue that the better measure of proba-
tive value paints a different picture. Such adherence to the usual sys-
tem of "free proof'-the analog of the economist's "free market"-is
reasonable as long as two conditions hold. First, the identification of
the cases in which P is misleading must not be prohibitively difficult.
This consideration counsels requiring the government to disclose to
the defense in advance of trial its best estimate of the similarity likeli-
hood ratio.
63
Second, the free proof system would fail ifjurors would be unduly
influenced by P even when the defense counters it with cross-examina-
tion and testimony about the similarity likelihood ratio. If reasonable
defense efforts would not prompt the jury to appreciate the prosecu-
tor's fallacy in relying on P, then the prosecution does not risk being
shown to be acting unfairly by intentionally or unwittingly presenting
evidence that overstates its case. Professor Thompson implies that this
type of "market failure" is a distinct possibility. He characterizes the
effort to present the similarity likelihood ratio as "a formidable task"
that "arguably would impose an unfair burden on a criminal defend-
ant."64 The point is indeed arguable, since it is not clear how juries
would react to a combination of P and the similarity likelihood ratio. 65
The general philosophy of most modem evidence codes is to allow
the jury to hear the evidence unless it is clear that prejudicial effect
intended to simulate cases of false accusations, gave only nine likelihood ratios greater
than 1, and most of these were below 100).
62 See Evett et al., supra note 42, at 325 (Table 7).
63 See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evience, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REv.
791 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of discoverable and meaningful expert reports).
64 Thompson, supra note 5, at 60. More recently, he has suggested that likelihood ra-
tios should not be used unless they "accurately take into account" uncertainties in the
examiner's decisions as to whether a band is present and where it lies on the gel. William
C. Thompson, Comment, 9 STAT. Sci. 263, 264 (1994). Even if this view were accepted, it
would not apply in the category of cases that is the subject of this Article. See supra note 15.
65 One might buttress the argument slightly by recognizing that if the specific likeli-
hood ratio (2) is going to be presented anyway, thejury learns little or nothing useful from




outweighs probative value, but few appellate courts would find an
abuse of discretion if a trial judge limited the jury to receiving the
expert description of import of the DNA profiles in the form of a
likelihood ratio.
Other reforms lie between these extremes. The forensic scientist
could include the likelihood ratio in a written report accessible to the
prosecution and the defense. If the ratio is markedly less than I/P,
the prosecution could be barred from introducing P without contem-
poraneous testimony during the direct examination of a prosecution
expert to the following effect: (a) it would be wrong to rely on P alone
in weighing the DNA evidence; (b) it is important to compare the
chance that comparable DNA profiles would arise when the defend-
ant is the source to the chance when the defendant is not the source;
and (c) this comparison shows that in this instance P exaggerates the
worth of the DNA evidence. 66 This policy of full disclosure reinforces
the norm of fair use of the evidence by the government without de-
priving the prosecution of the opportunity to place an appropriately
computed value of P before the jury.
Ultimately, even this solution seems unsatisfactory. If clear and
contemporaneous testimony about the similarity likelihood ratio suc-
ceeds in ensuring that the limitations on P are explained in an effec-
tive way, what is the point of the initial testimony about P?. If the jury
does not rely on P, then the time and argument expended on it is a
waste of resources-in economic terms, a dead weight loss. On the
other hand, if the jury does use P to gauge the probative value of the
DNA profiles, it makes a potentially serious cognitive error; by defini-
tion, the case is one in which 1/P is much higher than the similarity
ratio (2).
In this way, the result, in broad outline, might resemble Professor
Thompson's. In a subset of cases match-binning proportions should
be excluded, but the DNA profile evidence should be admissible when
explained in terms of a suitable likelihood ratio. 67 The subset of cases
may differ from those identified by Professor Thompson, but it con-
sists of precisely those in which the form of prejudice he identifies is a
serious risk. The response to this risk is neither outright exclusion of
DNA evidence nor admission of nonresponsive testimony about the
properties of match windows. 68 If the problem is sufficiently wide-
66 Other limitations on P that might justify similar, cautionary testimony in the interest
of full disclosure are described in Kaye, supra note 4, and Thompson, supra note 5.
67 For discussion of how a likelihood ratio might be presented or used, see Berry, supra
note 61; Kaye, supra note 4; Richard Lempert, Comment: Theory and Practice in DNA Finger-
printing, 9 STAT. Sci. 255, 258 (1994); Roeder, supra note 27; supra note 61.
68 Whether any special rules are required to handle the subset of cases in which match-
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spread, the best solution may be to use the similarity likelihood ratio
to more fairly present the DNA data.69
binning frequencies are misleading is not dear. Without an empirical analysis of the rate
at which the similarity likelihood ratio (2) is substantially less than match-binning likeli-
hood ratios, the size of this subset-and hence the suggestion that there is a widespread
problem that warrants a procedural solution-is speculative. Before demanding that all
laboratories compute similarity likelihood ratios to isolate the cases in which there would
be a discrepancy, empirical analysis to ascertain the extent of the problem would seem
advisable.
69 Some statisticians may question whether existing methods for computing (2) are ad-
equate. If such doubts are justified, then implementation of the approach recommended
in this Article would be premature, but it still would be reasonable to use the cruder
match-binning likelihood ratio (3) to measure probative value. This second best likeli-
hood ratio could stand in for the presently unavailable ratio (2) in the approach that is
outlined in this Article.
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